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directed verdict; but if contrary evidence is produced, the case should be for the jury,
with the normal burden of proving both value and lack of notice on the subsequent
purchaser.
In the normal situation this burden of persuasion never shifts. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (2d ed. 1923); McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 518, 82 N.E. 1057 (1907);
Lebens v. Wolf, 138 Minn. 435, 165 N.W. 276 (1917). However, even the burden of persuasion, on a particular issue, has been said to be shifted if the party having the burden
produces evidence raising a strong policy presumption, e.g. the presumption of legitimacy arising on proof that the mother was married at the time of birth. See Morgan,
Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 9o6, 921 (1931). Perhaps therefore, in some states where proof of recording does raise a strong presumption
that the legal title is with the recorded deed, a result contrary to the principal case
might well be reached. See Hoyt v. Jones, 31 Wis. 389 (1872); Lampe v. Kennedy, 56
Wis. 249, 14 N.W. 43 (1882) (holding the burden of proving both notice and lack of
consideration on the prior grantee).

Insurance-Interpretation of Risk Exclusion Clause in Automobile Owner's Liability Policy-[New York].--The plaintiff brought suit on a liability insurance policy
for injuries caused to him by the insured's automobile. At the time of the accident the
defendant's seventeen year old son, who had a junior operator's license, was driving
the car on his return from a social visit. The defendant insurance company pleaded the
clause in the policy providing that the policy "shall exclude any obligation of the company ....
while any described automobile is being driven .... by any person under
the age fixed by law ..... " (Italics added.) The New York statute stipulated that
"No license .... shall be issued to any person under eighteen years of age, except
that junior operators' licenses may be issued to minors who have arrived at the age of
sixteen years, but who have not reached eighteen years of age ....
provided, however, that such license shall entitle a licensee to operate a motor vehicle .... only in
traveling to and from school, and in the usual and ordinary pursuit of the business of
the parent or guardian of the licensee." N.Y. Cons. Laws 1935, c. 64-a, § 2o. Held,
(three judges dissenting), for the plaintiff. The driver was not a person under the age
fixed by law, and the exclusion clause in the policy did not excuse the insurance company from liability merely because the terms of the license had been violated. Taylor
v. U.S. Casualty Co., 269 N.Y. 360, 199 N.E. 620 (1936).
The exclusion clause in this policy can be literally interpreted in two ways: (r) the
driver was to observe the restrictions of his license and would be "under the age fixed
by law" in driving for purposes which a junior operator's license did not sanction, (2)
he was only to be of age to receive any license and his violation of its restrictions would
not make him "under the age fixed by law." By accepting the latter interpretation and
imposing liability, the court in the principal case recognized the policy of construing
ambiguous terms of insurance contracts in favor of the insured. Vance, Insurance
§ i79 (2d ed. i93o).
In applying this policy the courts have uniformly accorded no effect to general
"catch all" exclusion clauses. 29 CoL L. Rev. 1023 (1929). They have allowed recovery despite the usual clause that the insurer is liable only for injuries resulting from
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by one legally using or operating the same,
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though the driver violated statutory restrictions concerning speed, license, or age of
the driver. McMahon v. Pearlman, 242 Mass. 367, 136 N.E. 154 (1922); Fireman's
FundIns. Co. v. Haley, 129 Miss. 525,92 So. 635 (1922); Messersmith v. A mer. Fidelity
Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921). Also under a statute permitting no license to
one under eighteen years of age but permitting a person sixteen years old to drive if
accompanied by a licensed driver and a clause in the policy excluding liability of the
company for injuries caused by a driver "under the age limit fixed by law," recovery
has been allowed even though the driver was seventeen years old and unaccompanied.
Brock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 88 Conn. 308, 91 AUt. 279 (1914); Yorke v. Continental
Casualty Co., 64 Ont. 109 (1929). The United States Supreme Court went further in
allowing recovery by holding that the clause "under the age limit fixed by law" was
ambiguous, permitting the construction that it did not include a municipal ordinance.
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Guentter, 281 U.S. 34 (1930). Contra, Zolla v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 251 Ill. App. 197 (1929).
Other courts in construing clauses similar to that in the principal case have seized
upon almost imperceptible variations in grammar as bases for conflicting results:
Where the clause refused protection to one driving "in violation of law as to age," a
driver who violated a restrictive license like the one in the principal case has been
denied recovery. Hudak v. Union Indemnity Co., lo8 Conn. 598, 143 Ati. 885 (1928).
Despite the obvious similarity of the two clauses, the words "in violation of law as to
age" were considered as referring to any infringement of the driving age regulations,
and thus as not synonymous with the "under the age fixed by law" clause in the principal case. Cf.Morrison v. Royal Indemnity Co., i8o App. Div. 709, 167 N.Y.S. 732 (1917);
S. & E. Motor Hire Corp. v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 255 N.Y. 69, 174 N.E. 65 (1930); but
see Bitzer v. So. Surety Co., 245 Ill. App. 295 (1924). The dissent in the principal case
was based on the clause in the statute, "No person shall operate ....
a motor vehicle
.... unless he is duly licensed." Cahills Cons. L. N.Y. 1930, c. 64-a, § 20. Although
this clause adds nothing, as it would clearly be implied in any license statute, its omission in a statute amending and repealing one which contained such a clause has also
been made the basis of a decision allowing recovery against an insurance company.
Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Casualty Co., 147 Minn. 350, r8o N.W. 229 (1920); Cf.
MarylandCasualty Co. v. Friedman,45 F. (2d) 369 (C.C.A. 8th 193o); see also Wagoner
v. Fidelity and C. Co., 215 App. Div. 170, 213 N.Y.S. i88 (1926). It seems questionable
whether the inclusion of such a provision is of itself a sufficient foundation on which
to rest a contrary decision. The decision of the principal case seems more desirable in
that it gives effect to the general policy of requiring insurance companies to make very
clear any risk which they seek to exclude.

Insurance-Mutual Companies-Effect of Retroactive By-law under Reserved
Power-[New Jersey].-The insured's life insurance certificate expressly reserved the
right to bind members by subsequently enacted by-laws. After the insured had disappeared, the defendant society enacted a by-law to the effect that absence for seven
years without communication would not entitle any beneficiary to recover until the
full term of the member's life expectancy had expired, provided that up to such expiration premiums had been duly paid. The plaintiff, as beneficiary, after presenting proof
to the society of the insured's unexplained absence for seven years, brought this action
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